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Abstract
In this paper we present Deep Secure Encoding: a frame-
work for secure classification using deep neural networks,
and apply it to the task of biometric template protec-
tion for faces. Using deep convolutional neural networks
(CNNs), we learn a robust mapping of face classes to high
entropy secure codes. These secure codes are then hashed
using standard hash functions like SHA-256 to generate
secure face templates. The efficacy of the approach is
shown on two face databases, namely, CMU-PIE and Ex-
tended Yale B, where we achieve state of the art matching
performance, along with cancelability and high security
with no unrealistic assumptions. Furthermore, the scheme
can work in both identification and verification modes.
1 Introduction
Biometric template protection is an important factor in
making the deployment of biometric authentication as
widespread as string based password security. Authen-
tication on the basis of “who we are” instead of “some-
thing we possess” or “something we remember”, offers
convenience and often, stronger system security. The ad-
vantages of biometric authenticators are straightforward
to see but the disadvantages require further thought.
A typical biometric authentication system would use a
few samples of user’s biometric modality (e.g. image of
face, fingerprint or iris) for enrollment, and extract and
store a template of the user from them. During authenti-
cation, verification or identification is performed where a
given sample is matched against the stored templates and
depending on the matching score, access is granted or de-
nied. In order to motivate the importance of storing the
enrolled templates in a secure and cancelable manner, we
compare a biometric template to a string based password.
When registering a string password, a one way non-
invertible transform (i.e. a hash) of it is stored. During
verification, a password is entered and it’s hash value is
calculated. The hash is compared with the stored hash
and if the two strings matched exactly, their hashes would
match as well, and access would be granted. In such a
scenario, the stored hash reveals no information about the
original password and also, if the password is compro-
mised, it can be changed and a new hash can be stored.
This is the kind of security we desire from biometric tem-
plates as well. Unlike passwords, biometric modalities
lack two important aspects. 1) They rarely match exactly
between different readings, and 2) they cannot be changed
if compromised. Thus, the objective of biometric tem-
plate protection schemes is to extract authenticators from
biometric modalities that are 1) secure i.e. given the au-
thenticator, it should be infeasible to extract any informa-
tion about the original modality, and 2) cancelable i.e. if
compromised, it should be possible to extract a new au-
thenticator from the same modality.
2 Previous work
These objectives have been tackled for faces in different
ways. Schemes that used cryptosystem based approaches
but without hash functions include Fuzzy commitment
schemes by Ao and Li [1], Lu et al. [10] and Van Der
Veen et al. [21], and fuzzy vault by Wu and Qiu [22].
The fuzzy commitment schemes suffered from limited er-
ror correcting capacity or short keys in general. Fuzzy
vault schemes suffer from the problem that the data is
stored in the open between chaff points, and also that they
cause an overhead in storage space. Some quantization
schemes were used by Sutcu et al. [16, 17] to generate
somewhat stable keys. There were also several works that
combine the face data with user defined keys or user spe-
cific keys. These include combination with a password
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by Chen and Chandran [3], user specific token binding by
Ngo et al. [11, 19, 20], biometric salting by Savvides et
al. [13], and user specific random projection schemes by
Teoh and Yuang [18] and Kim and Toh [8]. Hybrid ap-
proaches that combine transform based cancelability with
cryptosystem based security like [6] have also been pro-
posed but give out user specific information to generate
the template creating possibilities of masquerade attacks.
Pandey and Govindraju [12] proposed a security centric
scheme that used features extracted from local regions
of the face to obtain exact matching and thus, benefited
from the security of hash functions like SHA-256. Al-
though seemingly more secure, the matching accuracy of
the scheme was low and the feature space being hashed
was not uniformly distributed.
Here, we propose a scheme that achieves state of the
art matching accuracy while maintaining a very high level
of security with no unrealistic assumptions. Furthermore,
the scheme can work in both verification and identifica-
tion modes while being truly key-less. The contributions
of this paper are as follows.
1. We design a secure classification scheme that
achieves state of the art matching performance on CMU-
PIE and Extended Yale B databases, while achieving tem-
plate cancelability and security.
2. We address the challenges of learning deep neural
networks with limited data in a biometric setting, as well
as, that of generating a ranged, tunable score from a clas-
sification framework.
3. We provide an analysis of the cancelability and secu-
rity of the generated templates in two scenarios and show
that the second, more secure scenario, achieves high se-
curity without any assumptions on the data distribution or
any need for parameter protection.
3 Method
Our work is inspired by the error correcting output codes
for multi-class classification, where one partitions a k-
class problem to multiple binary class problems [4]. In
addition, this framework relies on the superior feature
learning capability of deep convolutional neural networks
(CNNs) to learn this mapping from face images to the
codes assigned to each user. We exploit the classification
performance of the CNN along with the high entropy of
randomly generated binary codes for each class to design
an architecture with high matching accuracy as well as
high template security, with minimal or no assumptions.
We proceed to describe the method in detail.
3.1 Convolutional neural network
Convolutional neural networks (CNN) [9] are biologically
inspired models, which contain three basic components:
convolution, pooling and fully connect layers. In the con-
volution layer one tries to learn a filter bank given input
feature maps. The input of a convolution layer is a 3D
array with d number of 2D feature maps of size n1 × n2.
Let xijk denote the component at row j and column k in
the ith feature map, and we use x(l)i to denote the com-
plete ith feature map at layer l. If one want to learn hf
set of filters of size f1 × f2, the output x(l+1) for the next
layer will still be a 3D array with hf number of 2D fea-
ture maps of size (n1 − f1 + 1) × (n2 − f2 + 1). More
formally, the convolution layer computes the following:
x
(l+1)
j = s(
∑
i
Fij ∗ x(l)i + bj) (1)
where Fij denotes the filter that connect feature map xi
to output map x(l)j , bj is the bias for the jth output fea-
ture map, s(·) is some elementwise non-linearity function
and ∗ denotes the discrete 2D convolution. We denote k-
th convolutional layer with hf filters of size f1 × f2 by
hfC
(k)
f1×f2
The pooling (or subsample) layer takes a 3D feature
map and tries to down-sample/summarize the content
with less spatial resolution. Pooling is done for every fea-
ture map independently and with non-overlapping win-
dows. An intuition of such operation is to have some
build in invariance against small translation as well as re-
duce the computation for upper layers. For example, with
a pooling size of p1 × p2 an input with hf number of
2D feature maps of size n1 × n2 will result an output of
hf number of feature maps but of size n1/p1 × n2/p2.
For average (mean) pooling, the output will be the aver-
age value inside the pooling window, and for max pooling
the output will be the maximum value inside the pooling
window. We denote the k-th pooling layer with pooling
window size p1 × p2 by P (k)p1×p2 .
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Figure 1: An illustration of the deep secure encoding network used in this work. We use blue, orange, gray, yellow and
green rectangle to denote input, convolution layer, pooling layer, fully connected layer and the output, respectively.
The lightning shape is used to denote stochasticity in the layer. (Figure best viewed in color)
The fully connected layer connects all the input units
from the lower layer l to all the output units in the next
layer l + 1. In more detail, the next layer output is calcu-
lated by:
x(l+1) = s(Wx(l) + b) (2)
where x(l) is the vectorized input from layer l, W and
b are the parameters of the fully connected layers. We
denote the k-th fully connected layer with h number of
hidden units by F (k)h .
A CNN is commonly composed by several stacks of
convolution and pooling layers followed by a few fully
connected layers. During training the last layer is associ-
ated with some loss functional to provide training signals,
and the training for CNN can be done by using gradient
descent. For example, in classification the last layer is
normally a softmax layer and cross entropy is commonly
used as the loss function during training.
3.2 Deep secure encoding
For secure encoding, it is desirable to obtain a code that
is of high entropy so that the code is unlikely to reveal
any information regarding the encoded information. The
maximum entropy of a k-bit binary code will be obtained
if we generate the code with 0.5 probability of each bit
taking value one. A natural solution for secure encoding
is therefore to generate different binary code randomly for
each of the class and then try to learn the mapping from
the data to its corresponding code. This idea is very sim-
ilar to the idea in error correcting output codes [4] if we
view each bit as a binary partitioning of the dataset.
We take advantage of the superior learning ability of
the neural networks and try to learn this mapping from
data directly. Since the code is binary, for the last layer of
the neural network we apply the logistic function (f(x) =
(1+exp−x)−1) to get values between zero and one. Cross
entropy is used as the loss during training.
To obtain better generalization error, we employed
stochastic layers at higher layers of the network. The
stochastic activation function that we employed has the
following form:
s˜(x, η) = η + s(x+ η)
where η is a independent noise variable from some dis-
tribution, and s(·) is some elementwise non-linear func-
tion. The stochastic layer is able to model more com-
plicated distributions including mutimodal distributions,
which is desired here. In addition, it also has the po-
tential benefit of providing better generalization perfor-
mance, since adding noise has been found to be a good
way of regularization [14]. With the stochastic layer, this
network can also be viewed as an ensemble of binary clas-
sifier networks that share parameters. Similar as presented
in paper [2], here we use the method called “straight-
through”, which estimates the gradient of a stochastic unit
3
by just considering its differentiable parts. The architec-
ture that we used in this work is as follows: two con-
volutional layers of 32 filters of size 5 × 5 and 64 fil-
ters of size 3 × 3, each followed by max pooling layers
of size 2 × 2. The convolutional and pooling layers are
followed by two fully connected stochastic layers of size
2000 each, and finally the output. We use activation func-
tion s(x) = max(x, 0) for all layers, and for the stochas-
tic layers we set η ∼ N (0, 2). The network structure is
illustrated in Figure 1.
3.2.1 Data augmentation
In a biometric setting, we usually have limited enrollment
samples and thus, augmentation of the training set is re-
quired for good performance from the model. For each
training example of size m ×m, we perform the follow-
ing augmentation. Instead of using images of the original
size, we use partial crops of the original image, which also
provide enough information for classification purposes.
All possible crops of size n × n are extracted from the
original image yielding (m−n+1)×(m−n+1) crops. In
addition, we flip each crop along the vertical axis to obtain
an additional (m−n+1)×(m−n+1) images. Thus, each
image is augmented to 2× (m−n+1)× (m−n+1) im-
ages in order to give us more examples to train the CNN.
3.3 Secure template generation
Now that we have a trained neural network that learns how
to map face classes to our secure codes y, we can pro-
ceed to generating secure templates from the codes. We
consider two scenarios for this purpose. The first uses
the output of the network as it is, and the second quan-
tizes the output and hashes it using SHA-256 to generate
a more secure template. From here on we refer to these
two scenarios as scenario 1 and 2.
3.3.1 Scenario 1
In scenario 1, we use the output of the neural network
as it is, without any hashing. Thus, during enrollment,
we save the codes assigned to each class as our template.
During verification, a sample is fed through the network
and the output is now a real valued vector with values be-
tween 0 and 1. This is compared to the stored code for
the class and some distance measure is calculated against
it yielding a real valued score. The sample may now be
accepted or rejected depending on the threshold selected
for the score. Similarly for identification, the score can
be calculated against each of the stored codes and the
class yielding the best score can be identified as the face
class. In our case this score is proportional to the nega-
tive of the euclidean distance between the network output
and the stored code. The negative, or more specifically
max(scores) − score, is taken as the score in order to
maintain a protocol of the higher score being better. Next,
instead of doing this once for a face sample, we take sev-
eral crops of the sample (similar to our training process)
and calculate the average score for all crops. Thus, for a
test sample of size m × m we use all possible crops of
size n × n along with their corresponding flipped crops.
Now our score will be the mean of the scores of obtained
for all 2× (m− n)× (m− n) crops. Note that for secu-
rity purposes, this scenario best works in situations where
the network parameters can be protected. We analyze this
aspect in further detail in the security analysis section.
3.3.2 Scenario 2
For scenario 2, we quantize and hash the output of the
neural network to obtain high security. During enroll-
ment, instead of storing the codes for each class, we store
the SHA-256 hash of the codes. While verification, a
sample is fed through the network yielding a real val-
ued vector with values between 0 and 1. This output is
now quantized using 0.5 as a threshold to yield a binary
vector. If our network has been trained properly, and the
given sample is sufficiently close to the claimed class, this
code should correspond to the code assigned to the class
during training. Next, we take the SHA-256 hash of the
quantized output and compare it to the stored SHA-256
hash of the code assigned to the class. In order to yield
a score that can take a range of values instead of just a
binary yes or no, we use a technique similar to that of
scenario 1. Instead of using the full sized image, we use
all possible crops of the sample and count the number of
crops whose hashed outputs match correctly. This yields
a discrete score in the range of 0 to 2×(m−n)×(m−n).
Doing so makes the system score tunable and allows us to
set the security level of the system. In this scenario the
network parameters need not be protected and we do not
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Figure 2: ROC curves for CMU-PIE (scenario 1) with
varying bits of security.
need to make any assumptions to guarantee the security
of the system. This is explained in detail in the security
analysis section.
4 Experiments
We now proceed to give an overview of the datasets used
for our experiments and explain the evaluation protocols
used, as well as, the specifics of the parameters used for
experimentation.
Method Bits of security EER Accuracy
Hybrid Approach [6] 210 6.81% -
BDA [5] 76 - 93.30%
DSE (scenario 1) 256 1.36% 95.93%
DSE (scenario 2 ) 256 3.23% 95.68%
Table 3: Comparison with state of the art methods on
CMU-PIE dataset.
4.1 Databases
The CMU PIE [15] database consists of 41,368 images of
68 people under 13 different poses, 43 different illumina-
Figure 3: ROC curves for CMU-PIE (scenario 2) with
varying bits of security.
Figure 4: Genuine and imposter distributions for CMU-
PIE (scenario 1) with varying bits of security.
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Bits of security EER (scenario 1) Accuracy (scenario 1) EER (scenario 2) Accuracy (scenario 2)
128 1.61% 95.76% 4.05% 95.60%
256 1.36% 95.93% 3.23% 95.68%
512 1.63% 95.23% 3.59% 95.11%
1024 1.39% 95.82% 3.31% 95.67%
Table 1: Identification accuracy and equal error rate on CMU-PIE database with varying bits of security.
Bits of security EER (scenario 1) Accuracy (scenario 1) EER (scenario 2) Accuracy (scenario 2)
128 6.37% 85.20% 15.65% 85.10%
256 5.92% 86.77% 11.63% 86.92%
512 5.74% 84.37% 12.78 % 84.22%
1024 5.45% 84.86% 12.13% 84.66%
Table 2: Identification accuracy and equal error rate on Extended Yale B database with varying bits of security.
Figure 5: Genuine and imposter distributions for CMU-
PIE (scenario 2) with varying bits of security.
Figure 6: ROC curves for Extended Yale B (scenario 1)
with varying bits of security.
6
Figure 7: ROC curves Extended Yale B (scenario 2) with
varying bits of security.
Figure 8: Genuine and imposter distributions for Ex-
tended Yale B (scenario 1) with varying bits of security.
Figure 9: Genuine and imposter distributions for Ex-
tended Yale B (scenario 2) with varying bits of security.
tion conditions, and with 4 different expressions. We use
5 poses (c27, c05, c29, c09 and c07) and all illumination
variations for our experiments. 10 images are randomly
chosen for training and the rest are used for testing.
The extended Yale Face Database B [7] contains 2432
images of 38 subjects with frontal pose and under differ-
ent illumination variations. We use the cropped version of
the database for our experiments. Again, we use 10 ran-
domly selected images for training and the rest for testing.
4.2 Evaluation metrics
In order to evaluate the performance of our framework
under both scenario 1 and 2, we use the following met-
rics. For verification performance, we use ROC curves,
the equal error rate (EER), and the genuine and impos-
tor score distributions to measure matching performance.
The ROC curve is plotted between the false reject rate
(FRR) and the false acceptance rate (FAR) at all possible
values of score thresholds. Note that, in scenario 1, a real
valued score is obtained thus, the value of the threshold at
the EER is a valid operating point for the system. For sce-
nario 2, the score is in fact a discrete value and thus, the
EER value might not correspond to a threshold that can
be set for the system. For both scenarios we read the EER
value off the ROC curve in order to avoid assumptions re-
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garding the slope between the points at which FAR and
FRR are closest. For identification, we use the classifica-
tion accuracy as a measure of performance.
4.3 Experimental parameters
We use the same training procedure for both databases.
The original images are resized to m × m = 64 × 64
pixels. All possible crops of size n × n = 56 × 56 are
used to augment the training set, yielding 2 × 9 × 9 =
162 images for each training image. High entropy random
binary codes are generated and assigned to each class. We
vary the code length, and thus the bits of security of the
system, from k = 128− 1024 for our experiments. Next,
the network is trained to minimize the cross-entropy loss
against these codes for 100 epochs with a batch size of
200. The SHA-256 hashes of the codes assigned to each
class are stored as the templates.
During testing, all crops and their flipped versions are
extracted from each sample (162 in all), and the outputs
for each are calculated by feeding through the network.
For scenario 1, the score is proportional to the negative of
the mean of the euclidean distance between each crop’s
output and the stored code. In scenario 2, the output of
the network for each crop is quantized into a binary vec-
tor using 0.5 as the threshold. These binary vectors are
now hashed and the hashes are compared with the stored
hashes in the database. The score in this case is dis-
crete, and given by the number of matching hashes for
the sample. The genuine scores are calculated by match-
ing against the true class where as the imposter scores are
calculated by matching against all other enrolled classes
apart from the true class.
4.4 Results
The EER and accuracy for both scenarios on CMU PIE
are shown in Table 1. The ROC curves for scenario 1 and
2 at different bits of security are show in Figure 2 and Fig-
ure 3 respectively. Genuine and imposter score distribu-
tions for scenario 1 and 2 are shown in Figure 4 and Figure
5. Similarly, the EER and accuracy results for Extended
Yale B are shown in Table 2. ROC curves are shown in
Figure 6 and Figure 7, where as, genuine and imposter
distributions are shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9. It can be
seen that the performance of the system is consistent even
Figure 10: Genuine and imposter distributions for en-
rolled and unseen imposters at 256 bits of security.
when the bits of security is significantly varied. We also
compare our approach, Deep Secure Encoding (DSE), to
previous results on CMU PIE at comparable bits of secu-
rity in Table 3. Note that a fair comparison of our system
to previous work is scenario 1 since the score in this case
is based on the distance from the template as in the case
of [6, 5]. The distance based score od scenario 1 captures
how far the sample is from the template even in cases in
which the counting based score of scenario 2 would yield
no matches. Even so, our performance in terms of match-
ing in both scenarios is significantly better than previous
approaches. Also, the security offered by the system in
scenario 2 is higher and with fewer assumptions when
compared to past approaches.
5 Security analysis
We now discuss the security for both scenario 1 and 2. In
scenario 1, the codes are stored without hashing and thus,
given the codes and the network parameters, it is possi-
ble to retrieve some part of the original modality. Even
though there would be loss of information propagating
backwards through the network, this scenario is best used
only when the network parameters can be protected. We
consider this scenario to get a better idea of the distribu-
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tion of the genuine and impostor scores in terms of the
distance of the network output from the assigned codes,
and also to make our results comparable to the continu-
ous scores of other approaches.
In case of scenario 2, the SHA-256 hashes of the codes
are stored as templates and thus, even if the attacker has
both the templates as well as the network parameters, it
is not possible to retrieve any part of the original data.
The only possible attack on the template is that of brute
forcing through all the possible codes. The complexity
of this is of the order of 2k where k is the length of the
binary codes. An important aspect of the security offered
by scenario 2 is that, unlike previous works, we do not
need to make any assumptions about the distribution of
the data being hashed. When the hashed component of
the system fits a low entropy distribution, the search space
while brute forcing the templates is significantly reduced.
In our case, the data being hashed is the set of random
codes assigned to face classes. Since the codes are bit-
wise randomly generated, they possess maximum entropy
and the attacker would need to brute force a search space
that is truly of the size of 2k. Our system performs well
through a wide range of choices of k making is highly
secure against attacks.
Another concern is that of data that has not been seen
by the model. The genuine and imposter score distribu-
tions thus far indicate that the scores are well separated
for genuine and imposter users, but, our imposter set con-
sists of all other enrolled classes apart from the genuine
one. Thus, we do another experiment to test the perfor-
mance of the system against imposters that have not been
seen by the model. For this purpose, we train our model
on 20 classes from CMU PIE and generate two sets of im-
poster scores, one using classes from within the 20 used
for enrollment and another using all samples from the re-
maining 48 classes. We refer to these as imposter enrolled
and imposter unseen and the score distributions for sce-
nario 1 and 2 are shown in Figure 10. We can see that
the imposter distribution for unseen imposters is almost
identical to that of the enrolled imposters indicating the
robustness of the system to unseen imposters.
Lastly, it is strightforward to see that cancelability can
also be achieved by assigning a new set of random codes
to user classes.
6 Conclusion
We presented a secure classification scheme that achieves
state of the art matching performance, along with high se-
curity with no unrealistic assumptions. The work portrays
the high learning capacity of deep networks and we ad-
dress some of the issues related to limited data training in
the application of deep learning to biometrics. Our future
plans are to analyze other issues in the application of pow-
erful deep learning architectures to the needs of the bio-
metrics community. We also intend to test the system on
more difficult face databases and other biometric modali-
ties, working towards designing a multi-modal framework
that is agnostic to the type of biometric modality it has to
work with.
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